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1. Introduction 
 
The European Union has mandated a 20% reduc- 
tion in energy use by 2020 (European Parliament and 
the Council of the European Union, 2012) with fur- 
ther reductions mandated into the future, while the 
Paris Agreement has emphasised the need to reach 
peak greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible 
(United Nations, 2015). One-sixth of emissions in the 
European Union are estimated to occur in residential 
buildings (European Commission, 2011a), while space 
and water heating account for 67% and 14% of res- 
idential energy consumption, respectively (European 
Commission, 2011b). Similarly, 22.5% of energy con- 
sumption in the U.S. occurs in residential buildings 
(Department of Energy, 2012). Two-thirds of build- 
ings in the European Union were built before the in- 
troduction of energy performance standards, with an 
average of only 1% of these buildings being renovated 
each year (European Commission, 2016). As such, im- 
proving the energy efficiency of the residential building 
stock provides a significant opportunity to contribute 
to limiting global warming to below 2◦C. 
The rental market accounts for a large share of res- 
idential buildings throughout the world. In the Euro- 
pean Union, 29.9% of residential buildings are occu- 
pied by tenants, rising to 33.1% in the Euro area and 
as high as 35.2% and 47.6% in the UK and Germany, 
respectively (Eurostat, 2015). In the United States, 
34.6% of occupied housing units are occupied by 
rental tenants (U.S. Census Bureau, 2015). The rental 
sector, however, is generally less energy efficient than 
that of owner-occupied homes. In the U.S., 70% of 
rental properties are considered either ‘well insulated’ 
or ‘adequately insulated’, relative to 84% of owner- 
occupied properties, while 13% of rental properties 
possess water heaters of more than 20 years old, rela- 
tive to just 8% of owner-occupied homes (EIA, 2013). 
Similar patterns exist in the EU. In England, for ex- 
ample, private rental accommodation had lower levels 
of cavity insulation and loft insulation than owner- 
occupied homes (DfCLG, 2013). In Ireland, where 
the energy performance certificate database is publicly 
available, the distribution of energy labels for rental 
and other properties can be examined in detail. These 
are known as Building Energy Ratings (BER) and Fig- 
ure 1 shows the distribution of all known Building En- 
ergy Ratings for private rental dwellings alongside that 
of Building Energy Ratings assessed for purposes other 
than private rental. As can be seen, both distribu- 
tions are heavily skewed toward less efficient grades. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Proportional distribution of Irish Building Energy Rat- 
ings 
 
While the total distribution possesses a slightly greater 
proportion of homes in the least efficient grades, ‘F’ 
and ‘G’, the distribution of rental properties is further 
skewed, possessing a greater proportion of homes in 
‘C’, ‘D’ and ‘E’ grades. 
There is clearly potential to improve the energy effi- 
ciency of the rental stock and, as such, it is of interest 
to understand whether landlords require incentives to 
do so. As will be discussed in Section 2, improved en- 
ergy efficiency, in the form of improved energy perfor- 
mance certificates, has been shown to attract a price 
premium in many rental markets, which in turn pro- 
vides an incentive to landlords to improve the energy 
efficiency of their property/properties. Rental mar- 
ket conditions, however, may act as a disincentive for 
landlords to engage in retrofitting works which would 
lead to greater energy efficiency. We refer to a stressed 
rental market as one in which demand for rental prop- 
erties is growing at a faster rate than supply, forc- 
ing rent prices upward. In such conditions, rental in- 
come to landlords will increase regardless of the con- 
dition of the accommodation, thus reducing the need 
to maintain or improve living standards as a means 
of generating greater income. The upward pressure 
on rental prices will also place downward pressure on 
the willingness-to-pay of renters for improved energy 
efficiency, as higher rent costs will reduce the abil- 
ity of renters to pay for improved energy efficiency 
within their budget constraint, while less choice and 
greater search times will reduce the standard of living 
accepted by individual renters in order to find accom- 
modation. 
The Irish rental market from 2013 to 2016 provides 
an example of such stressed market conditions. Dur- 
ing the four year period from Q3 2013 to Q3 2016, 
rents rose by an average of 7.27% (RTB, 2016), com- 
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pared to an average increase in average weekly earn- 
ings of 0.95% (CSO, 2016). This is due to a number 
of forces in the market. Economic recovery in Ireland 
has mainly been confined to its cities, particularly the 
capital, Dublin, increasing employment in these areas, 
which in turn increased the number of people living in 
these areas. Increasing costs in the housing market, 
combined with tighter mortgage regulation in Ireland 
have forced households from the purchase market to 
the rental market, while a deficit in social housing has 
led to a movement of households into the rental mar- 
ket who would otherwise receive social housing. This 
increase in demand for rental accommodation has co- 
incided with a consistent decrease in supply, for ex- 
ample the year to October 2016 saw a 12% fall in the 
number of homes available for rent nationwide (Lyons, 
2016). 
This study aims to use survey data to estimate the 
willingness-to-pay of rental tenants for improved en- 
ergy efficiency, measured using energy performance 
certificates, and how this varies across the character- 
istics of households. We use Ireland as a case study, 
where high rental demand, particularly in cities, com- 
bined with a decreasing supply has created significant 
upward pressure on rents. We then use a dataset of 
energy efficiency retrofits to gauge the costs incurred 
and energy efficiency improvements available through 
engaging in various retrofitting measures. These are 
used to calculate guideline payback periods for invest- 
ments in energy efficiency by landlords. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. 
Section 2 outlines related literature. Section 3 out- 
lines the data used and methods of analysis. Section 
4 presents and discusses the results of the analysis. 
Section 5 then concludes 
 
2. Relevant Literature 
The literature on willingness-to-pay for household 
energy efficiency is dominated by stated preference 
techniques. Discrete choice experiments are used to 
model the preferences of home owners with regard to 
energy efficiency measures under choice models such 
as those developed by McFadden (1984). Modelled 
trade-offs in utility between costs and energy effi- 
ciency improvements are then used to estimate the 
willingness of home owners to pay for either over- 
all measured energy efficiency improvements (Acht- 
nicht, 2011) or for specific energy efficiency measures 
(Cameron, 1985; Jaccard and Dennis, 2006; Banfi 
et al., 2008; Kwak et al., 2010). Others have used dis- 
crete choice methods to examine revealed preferences, 
imposing ex-post discrete choice sets comprised of ob- 
served retrofits among home owners and other retrofit 
options foregone for these observed choices (Gro¨sche 
and Vance, 2009; Collins and Curtis, 2016b). 
A wide literature exists examining the observed 
price premiums for energy efficiency in the purchase 
sector. Carroll et al. (2016) provided a review of lit- 
erature on this relationship. There is an expansive 
literature with regard to this premium for the sale of 
homes in various countries, including the U.S. (Bloom 
et al., 2011), across EU countries (DG Energy, 2013) 
and more specifically in Germany (Cajias and Piazolo, 
2013), the Netherlands (Brounen and Kok, 2011), 
England (Fuerst et al., 2015), Wales (Fuerst et al., 
2016) and Ireland (Hyland et al., 2013). In the rental 
sector, however, there exists a narrower but emerg- 
ing literature on rental price premiums for energy ef- 
ficiency. In a review of energy performance certifi- 
cates (EPC) in selected European countries, DG En- 
ergy (2013) found rental price premiums for an in- 
crease of one EPC letter grade or equivalent of 4.4% 
in Austria, 1.5–3.2% in different areas of Belgium and 
1.4% in Ireland. Hyland et al. (2013) also found an 
average increase in rental costs of AC5 per month for 
each EPC grade in Ireland. 
Looking specifically toward willingness to pay for 
rental accommodation, discrete choice modelling of 
stated preference data again dominates the litera- 
ture. For example, Farsi (2010) undertook a discrete 
choice experiment and used random effects regres- 
sions of various functional forms to analyse risk premia 
and willingness-to-pay for energy efficiency in rental 
apartments in Switzerland, finding a willingness-to- 
pay for various retrofit measures of between 0 and 
11.3% of monthly rent. Phillips (2012) also used a 
discrete choice experiment to elicit willingness to pay 
for energy efficiency ratings of home owners, renters 
and landlords. Using a nested logit, Phillips found 
a median willingness-to-pay of $3.23 per week for 
Home Energy STAR certification in the United States. 
Galassi and Madlener (2016) used a discrete choice ex- 
periment, asking survey respondents to imagine they 
lived in a cold apartment and presenting a s eries 
of discrete choices between retrofitting measures for 
that cold apartment. Using a mixed effects logit, 
Galassi and Madlener found that rental tenants ex- 
pected a greater disutility from the costs of retrofitting 
than home owners. As such, renters were less likely 
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to choose greater energy efficiency improvements as 
these would be more expensive. In Ireland, Carroll 
et al. (2016) conducted a survey of rental tenants, 
providing respondents with a discrete choice between 
differing apartments. Carroll et al. (2016) found, us- 
ing a mixed logit, that tenants were willing to pay 
more for EPC improvements than they would be ex- 
pected to save on energy costs, with willingness-to- 
pay falling when moving from less efficient to more 
efficient grades. 
We intend to add to the literature on household 
willingness-to-pay for energy efficiency in the rental 
sector in three ways. Firstly, we understand that not 
all households in the sector are willing to pay for im- 
proved energy efficiency and attempt to determine 
whether significant predictors of whether a household 
is in fact willing to pay for such improvements exist. 
Secondly, in addition to complementing the literature 
on the magnitude of the willingness-to-pay by using 
a different methodology to analyse a similar issue to 
Carroll et al. (2016), we examine whether the intro- 
duction of information regarding energy performance 
certificates affects either of these issues. Thirdly, we 
examine the necessity of government subsidies as a 
means of improving the energy efficiency of the rental 
building stock. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.1. Data Collection 
 
To explore the willingness-to-pay for improved en- 
ergy efficiency of rental tenants, responses were col- 
lected as part of a wider survey of energy related 
decision-makers in Ireland. An online survey was de- 
signed in three iterations. Firstly, the survey was de- 
veloped and pre-tested by colleagues, most of which 
possessed post-graduate degrees in economics or other 
social sciences. This led to the exclusion or modifica- 
tion of several items. This was followed by a pilot sur- 
vey to test to a small sample of respondents, recruited 
by a market research firm and finally, a full launch. A 
nationally representative sample of the Republic of Ire- 
land was recruited in the final stage (n=2,430). This 
sample is demographically representative of age and 
region in Ireland. Of this sample, 866 responses were 
made by individuals living in rental accommodation, 
renting either from a private landlord, from a local 
authority or from a voluntary or co-operative housing 
body. 
Of the recruited panel, screening questions were 
used to first ensure respondents were involved, either 
solely or jointly, in energy-related decision-making and 
secondly to ensure data quality through tests of re- 
spondents attentiveness to the survey. Any respon- 
dents who completed the survey in a time below the 
1st percentile or above the 99th percentile of the dis- 
tribution were excluded. Our final sample consists of 
436 rental tenants. 
3.2. Survey Design 
The survey included several modules related to en- 
ergy efficiency and background characteristics. After 
gathering information on the characteristics of respon- 
dents’ dwellings and their rental tenure, a dichoto- 
mous choice contingent valuation methodology was 
used to determine willingness-to-pay. All respondents 
were first asked the following: 
“Consider a situation where you are ap- 
proached with the following proposition re- 
garding your accommodation. 
Your landlord offers you a similar property to 
your current accommodation, which is the 
same size, has the same number of rooms, 
same location in terms of proximity to shops, 
transport, neighbours, work, college, etc. 
The only difference is that the new accom- 
modation is more energy efficient and there- 
fore has a lower combined cost for heating, 
lighting and ventilation. Energy efficiency is 
measured on the BER scale with 15 grades 
from A1 to G, with A1 being the most effi- 
cient. 
Taking into account your own circum- 
stances, would you be willing to pay more in 
your monthly rent if the new accommoda- 
tion was one grade better on the BER scale 
(e.g. D1 instead of D2 or B3 instead of 
C1)?” 
 
Answers in the affirmative were then provided with 
a double-bounded dichotomous choice willingness-to- 
pay bidding scenario. Those who expressed an un- 
willingness to pay for an improved Building Energy 
Rating were screened out of the two bid questions, 
which were then presented as follows: 
“Would you be willing to pay ACXX in in- 
creased monthly rent if your landlord en- 
gaged in renovations that would improve the 
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Building Energy Rating of the property by 
ONE GRADE (e.g. from E1 to D2, or from 
C3 to C2)?” 
 
Respondents were randomly assigned starting bids 
of AC20, AC30 or AC40. Positive responses led to an in- 
creased bid of AC10 greater, while negative responses 
were followed by a second bid AC10 less than the orig- 
inal bid. These figures were chosen based on the es- 
timated savings associated with improvements in a 
dwelling’s Building Energy Rating, as published by 
the Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland (SEAI, 
2014). Based on pilot survey responses, these bid val- 
ues were broadly spread across the central distribution 
of willingness-to-pay. 
This was followed by the treatment, i.e. the intro- 
duction of information. Regardless of their knowledge 
of Building Energy Ratings prior to the survey, all re- 
spondents were provided with the following informa- 
tion: 
 
“A Building Energy Rating (BER) is an indi- 
cation of the energy performance of a home. 
BER is the calculated energy use for space 
and hot water heating, ventilation and light- 
ing based on standard consumption, in kilo- 
watt hours, for every square metre of a 
dwelling. A BER is similar to the energy la- 
bel for a household electrical item like your 
fridge. The label has a scale of A-G. A-rated 
homes are the most energy efficient and tend 
to have the lowest energy bills. 
In a typical apartment, a one grade improve- 
ment from D1 to C3 could save the oc- 
cupant approximately AC200 in energy costs 
each year. For a large, detached house, the 
same improvement could save AC800, based 
on standard occupancy. The reductions in 
costs associated with improvements in BER 
vary depending on the size of a home and 
how efficient it is prior to having energy ef- 
ficient renovations undertaken. 
In light of this information, taking into ac- 
count your own circumstances, would you 
be willing to pay more in your monthly rent 
if the new accommodation was one grade 
better on the BER scale” 
 
Those who answered in the affirmative were then 
presented with a further double-bounded dichotomous 
choice willingness-to-pay bid scenario. Bid questions 
following the treatment replicated the bid questions 
prior to the introduction of information. 
Those who expressed an unwillingness to pay for an 
improved Building Energy Rating following the treat- 
ment were screened to a question regarding reasons 
for this unwillingness. In addition to an open-ended 
response, respondents were asked to state their agree- 
ment with a number of potential explanations. The 
distribution of responses to this question is provided 
in fig. 2. As can be seen, the most common reason 
provided for this unwillingness was that respondents 
did not feel they could afford to pay any more in their 
monthly rent, with approximately 85% of those un- 
willing to pay agreeing either somewhat or strongly 
with the statement. This was followed by those who 
believed any energy cost savings would be offset by 
increased rent. The third-most ‘agreed with’ state- 
ment was that respondents’ accommodation was al- 
ready suitably energy efficient. Further reasons cited 
were that respondents did not want to provide more 
income to their landlord, while approx. 30% of those 
unwilling to pay for improved energy efficiency ex- 
pressed a lack of trust in Building Energy Ratings as 
a reliable indicator of energy efficiency. We therefore 
categorise responses to this question as either those of 
respondents possessing a willingness-to-pay (WTP) of 
zero or as protest responses. Those who agreed with 
the former three statements were deemed to possess a 
WTP of zero. Responses which did not express agree- 
ment with these three statements but did agree with 
one or both of the latter two statements were deemed 
protest responses. This is because those lacking trust 
in Building Energy Ratings may be otherwise willing 
to pay for greater energy efficiency, while those not 
willing to provide their landlord with greater income 
may be willing to do so with a more preferable land- 
lord. Responses agreeing with one or both of the latter 
two statements who also agreed with one of the for- 
mer three statements were categorised as possessing a 
WTP of zero. This is because these three statements 
dominate the latter two. We provide an example of a 
respondent who does not want to provide their land- 
lord with more income but who also cannot afford 
more rent. In the case that the respondent was in a 
similar rental situation but with a landlord who they 
did not have an issue with providing more income to, 
they would remain unable to afford higher rent costs. 
Further respondents were also classed as protest re- 
sponses based on open-ended responses, such as those 
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Figure 2: Reasons given for expressing an unwilling to pay for improved energy efficiency 
 
misunderstanding the question and citing an unwill- 
ingness to go through the process of moving home, 
a misunderstanding of how BER is calculated, com- 
plaints about landlords being unwilling to refurbish 
their accommodation, etc. Of 436 respondents, re- 
moving protest responses left a remaining sample of 
415 respondents. 
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the responses 
to the double-bounded dichotomous choice questions. 
After the introduction of information, a greater num- 
ber of respondents expressed a willingness to pay for 
improved energy efficiency, although the proportion 
of those responding negatively to the first bid also 
increased. Without information, 156, or 38% of re- 
spondents expressed a willingness to pay more in their 
monthly rent for an improved Building Energy Rating. 
This proportion increased to 55.2%, or 229 respon- 
dents, following the provision of information. Figure 
3 then provides the proportional distribution of re- 
spondents present in each bounded willingness-to-pay 
bracket based on answers provided to the dichotomous 
choice questions. The introduction of information led 
to changes in the proportion of households in the AC0- 
30 and AC40-50 categories but otherwise has not al- 
tered the shape of the distribution. 
 
As a proxy for market stress, we asked respondents 
their location, dividing responses into four regions. 
These are based on responses to a question asking to 
what extent “rental market pressures” influenced their 
choice of rental accommodation. The first of these are 
Dublin City and the remaining Greater Dublin Area 
(GDA), which comprises Dublin County and the coun- 
ties of Meath, Kildare and Wicklow. Thirdly, the other 
cities of Ireland, i.e. Cork, Limerick, Galway and Wa- 
terford, and lastly, the rest of Ireland. These areas 
were chosen based on responses to how much influ- 
ence market pressure placed on respondents’ choice of 
rental accommodation. As described in fig. 4, market 
pressure exerted greatest influence in Dublin and the 
GDA, with approximately 55% of respondents in both 
areas indicating that market pressure exerted a major 
influence on, or took precedence in influencing their 
decision. This falls to approximately 40% in other 
cities, with the rest of Ireland citing market pressure 
the least. 
 
Other information collected included a range of 
socio-demographic characteristics of respondents, in- 
cluding their working status, location, age, the num- 
ber of and age of occupants in the household and 
whether they are in receipt of specific housing sup- 
ports1. With regard to the characteristics of their 
rental tenure, respondents are asked the length and 
type of their tenure, in addition to the cost of rent. 
Respondents are also asked whether they know the 
Building Energy Rating of their accommodation and if 
so, into which letter-grade category does their accom- 
modation fall. Unknown Building Energy Ratings are 
estimated according to Curtis et al. (2015). Also col- 
lected are questions on energy-related knowledge and 
on pro-environmental and energy-related behaviours. 
The answers to these questions are collated to create 
knowledge and behaviour indices, both of which are 
standardised about zero. Details of questions asked 
and the calculation of these behaviour and knowledge 
indices are provided in appendices A and B, respec- 
tively. Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 2. 
 
 
 
1Subsidies chosen are those which provide eligibility for 
the Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland’s Better Energy 
Warmer Homes scheme, which provides grant aid for house- 
holds subject to fuel poverty. 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Bounded Willingness-to-Pay of respondents to dichotomous choice contingent valuation survey 
Table 1: Responses to double-bounded dichotomous choice questions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3. Methodology 
3.3.1. Possessing a non-zero willingness-to-pay 
Assuming non-negative willingness-to-pay for im- 
proved energy efficiency and given that only a propor- 
tion of respondents expressed a non-zero willingness- 
to-pay, we are interested in examining whether 
there are any significant predictors of possessing a 
willingness-to-pay. We therefore specify a selection 
model of the likelihood of possessing a non-zero 
willingness-to-pay for improved energy efficiency as 
follows: 
 
Pr(WTP > 0) = Pr(y1i = 1) = αzi + ui1 (1) 
Without Information 
Non-Zero Willingness-to-Pay No Yes 
Respondents 259 156 
(Proportion) (62.4) (37.6) 
First Bid  No Yes 
Respondents 25 131 
(Proportion) (6) (31.6) 
Second Bid  No Yes No Yes 
Respondents 14 11 53 78 
(Proportion) (3.4) (2.7) (12.8) (18.8) 
With Information 
Non-Zero Willingness-to-Pay No Yes 
Respondents 186 229 
(Proportion) (44.8) (55.2) 
First Bid  No Yes 
Respondents 53 176 
(Proportion) (12.8) (42.4) 
Second Bid  No Yes No Yes 
Respondents 29 24 64 112 
(Proportion) (7) (5.8) (15.4) (27) 
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Figure 4: Reported influence of “rental market pressures” on respondents’ choice of rental accommodation, by region 
 
where y1i takes a value of one if respondent i pos- 
sesses a non-zero willingness-to-pay, α is a vector of 
parameters, zi is a vector of explanatory variables and 
u1 is the error term. We estimate this model using a 
standard probit regression. To test for sample selec- 
tion bias in the outcome model, i.e. the willingness-to- 
pay equation, we must include an explanatory variable 
which affects the likelihood of possessing a non-zero 
willingness-to-pay but which does not affect the out- 
come. We include respondents’ region, which, as pre- 
viously discussed, acts as a proxy for market pressure 
improved energy efficiency, we categorise each respon- 
dent possessing a non-zero willingness-to-pay into four 
binary outcomes. These are based on responses to bid 
offers presented in the contingent valuation questions 
and described as follows, with B1i and B2i represent- 
ing the first and second bid presented to respondent 
i, respectively: 
 
IY Y  = 1(B1i = “yes”, B2i = “yes”) 
IY N  = 1(B1i = “yes”, B2i = “no”) 
but it is arguable that income, which is likely to be cor- 
related with region, affects respondents’ willingness- 
to-pay. 
i 
INY  = 1(B1i = “no”, B2i = “yes”) 
INN  = 1(B1i = “no”, B2i = “no”) 
(3) 
 
3.3.2. Contingent Valuation 
We employ a double-bounded dichotomous choice 
contingent valuation, estimating an interval-censored 
model which is seen as best practice in the literature 
(Cameron and Quiggin, 1994; Haab, 1998). Condi- 
tional upon possessing a non-zero willingness-to-pay, 
the true willingness-to-pay for improved energy effi- 
ciency, y∗, of respondent i can be expressed as fol- 
lows: 
where 1(.) is an indicator function taking a value of 
one when the argument is true and zero if false. Tak- 
ing this into account, the log-likelihood function of the 
double-bounded dichotomous choice contingent valu- 
ation model can be described as follows: 
 
lnL = ΣN {IY Y ln[1 − φ( 
B2i − βxi 
)]+ 
IY N ln[φ( 
B2i − βxi 
) − φ( 
B1i − βxi 
)]+ 
y2
∗
i = βxi + ui2 (2) 
i σ σ 
INY ln[φ( 
B1i − βxi 
) − φ( 
B2i − βxi 
)]+ 
where β represents a vector of parameters, xi repre- 
i σ σ 
NN B1i − βxi 
sents a vector of determinants of willingness-to-pay 
and the error, u2, is assumed to possess a normal 
distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation σ. 
Ii ln[φ( σ 
)]}  
(4) 
This equation forms the basis for estimating the valua- 
tion function of each respondent. In order to estimate 
a valuation function depicting the monetary value of 
where φ(.) is again the standard normal cumulative 
distribution function and ln stands for natural loga- 
rithm. 
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Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics 
 
Observations Proportion Observations Proportion 
r 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Reduced sample size due to non-completion or incorrect completion of question and removal of outiers. 
 
Estimating such a model yields an estimate of 
the willingness-to-pay of rental tenants for improved 
Building Energy Ratings. However, our dataset is 
comprised of a sample of respondents who expressed 
an explicit unwillingness to pay for improved energy 
efficiency and a sample of respondents who are will- 
ing to pay varying amounts for a one-grade BER im- 
provement. This specification assumes the two yes/no 
willingness-to-pay responses produced in the survey 
to be jointly distributed discrete random variables. If 
this assumption is incorrect, the specification outlined 
risks underestimating mean WTP for the population 
and a bivariate specification may be more appropri- 
ate Cameron and Quiggin (1998). As we can only 
analyse our model based on those who expressed a 
willingness to pay of greater than zero, it is possible 
that our estimates are subject to selection bias, i.e. 
estimated levels of willingness-to-pay would likely be 
greater than those of the population as those possess- 
ing a willingness-to-pay of zero are not included in the 
analysis. In order to test for selection bias, we follow 
Heckman (1979) in including the inverse Mills ratio, 
calculated using the estimation of results of the pro- 
bit model discussed in Section 3.3.1, as an explanatory 
variable. 
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1. Willingness to pay for energy efficiency 
4.1.1. Likelihood of possessing a non-zero 
willingness-to-pay 
We are first interested in identifying characteristics 
of rental tenants who may be more likely to possess a 
willingness-to-pay (WTP) of greater than zero. These 
are tenants which provide an incentive for landlords to 
improve the energy efficiency of rental properties. In 
the case that rental tenants possess a non-zero WTP, 
landlords could invest in energy efficiency and extract 
greater surplus, potentially in many instances without 
reducing consumer welfare. We estimate the selection 
equation discussed in Section 3.3.1, results of which 
are presented in Table 3. 
Without information, findings can be categorised 
into four principal areas. These are that tenure length, 
socio-demographics, market pressure and individual 
characteristics matter. The results show that the 
length of time a household has lived in their accommo- 
dation has an effect on the likelihood that decision- 
makers are willing to pay for improved energy effi- 
ciency. Those living in their accommodation for be- 
tween one to three years, three to five years and 5 
to ten years are all more likely to possess a non- 
zero willingness-to-pay than short term tenancies of 
less than one year and long-term tenancies of greater 
Tenure 
Rent from a private landlord 317 0.76 
Tenure Length 
Less than one yea 76 0.18 
Rent from a local authority 85 0.20 1 - 3 years 136 0.33 
Rent from a voluntary/co-operative housing body   13  0.03 3 - 5 years 83 0.20 
 415  5 - 10 years 61 0.15 
Type of accommodation 
Student/Shared 13 0.03 
10 + years   59  
415 
0.14 
Other   402  0.97 Working Status 
Receipt of Subsidies 
415  Working full-time 
Working part-time 
167 
74 
0.40 
0.18 
Yes 152 0.37 Working the home/carer 46 0.11 
No   263  0.63 Unemployed 40 0.10 
 415  Retired  29 0.07 
Building Energy Rating   Student 37 0.09 
ABC 161 0.39 Unable to work due to sickness/disability  22  0.05 
DEFG   254  0.61 415  
 415  Region  
Respondent knew BER   Dublin City  109 0.26 
Yes 137 0.33 Other Cities 64 0.15 
No   278  0.67 Greater Dublin Area (ex. D) 61 0.15 
 415  Rest of Ireland   181  0.44 
    415  
Occupants under 18 
  Observations  
415 
Mean  
0.75 
Std. Dev.  
1.06 
Min  
0 
Max  
5 
Occupants aged 19 - 64 415 1.93 0.96 0 7 
Occupants aged 65 + 415 0.10 0.37 0 2 
Age 415 37.37 12.74 18 78 
Energy-related behaviour (scale 0-1) 415 0.62 0.14 0.15 0.91 
Energy-related knowledge (scale 0 - 14) 415 5.59 1.75 1 11 
Rent per person (AC) 4081 320.50 253.84 6 2500 
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than ten years. The differences in likelihood across 
these three categories, however, are not statistically 
different to one another. Other rental characteristics 
were not found to be significant predictors prior to the 
treatment. 
With regard to market stress, respondents in the 
Greater Dublin Area and other cities were found to 
be no more or less likely than those in Dublin City to 
possess a non-zero WTP. Those in the rest of Ireland, 
however, are found to be less likely to possess a non- 
zero WTP. While it is unclear the exact cause of this, it 
is possible that tenants in more stressed areas, i.e. the 
cities and commuter belt, are forced to or feel obliged 
to choose accommodation which does not meet their 
initial preferences, while those in low pressure areas 
are more likely to be able to find accommodation with 
which they are satisfied. 
Age and working status are found to be significant 
predictors. As people age, they are less likely to pos- 
sess a non-zero WTP, while those working part-time, 
students and those working the home and carers were 
all found to be more likely than those working full-time 
to be willing to pay more in their monthly rent for im- 
proved energy efficiency. Those with higher scores in 
self-reported pro-environmental behaviour were also 
found to be more likely to possess a non-zero WTP, 
although those with greater levels of energy-related 
knowledge were not. The structure of the household, 
with regard to the number of occupants of varying 
age categories, was not found to be statistically sig- 
nificant. The Building Energy Rating of properties did 
not play a significant role in prediction, nor did the the 
indicator variable of whether a respondent knew their 
dwelling’s BER. 
The introduction of information led to an increase 
in the likelihood of being willing to pay for improved 
energy efficiency for those working full-time and those 
not in receipt of subsidies. These are categories more 
likely to be able to afford to pay for higher rents. Upon 
the introduction of information, those paying higher 
rents also became less likely to possess a non-zero 
WTP. 
As discussed in Section 3.2, a number of options 
were presented to home owners who expressed an 
unwillingness-to-pay for improved energy efficiency. 
As discussed, the valid reasons most cited were that 
respondents’ could not afford to pay higher rents, that 
energy cost savings would be offset by increases in 
rent and that their accommodation was already suit- 
ably energy efficient. That 85% of those expressing 
an unwillingness to pay for energy efficiency cited an 
inability to pay higher rent could be seen as worrying 
from a standard of living perspective, although rent 
costs per occupant was not found to be a significant 
predictor of possessing a non-zero WTP in the no in- 
formation condition. 
 
4.1.2. Conditional willingness-to-pay 
We next estimated the willingness-to-pay for im- 
proved energy efficiency, conditional on possessing a 
non-zero WTP. Results of the WTP estimation are 
presented in Table 4. Estimates from our model in- 
dicate a mean WTP in our sample of AC41.72 with a 
standard deviation of 8.71. As discussed in Section 
3.3.2, we include the inverse Mills ratio of the selec- 
tion model as an explanatory variable in the outcome 
equation, i.e. the willingness-to-pay model. As shown, 
this term is not statistically significant either before 
or after the treatment. As such, we can conclude 
that sample selection is not an issue in the outcome 
equation and therefore that the selection and outcome 
equations are independent. Alternatively, the insignif- 
icance of the inverse Mills ratio could be due to an 
unsatisfactorily specified selection model. The impli- 
cation of such situation is that there may be bias intro- 
duced into the magnitude of estimated WTP, though 
the overall policy conclusion is unlikely to be effected. 
We identify significant predictors of household 
WTP for improved energy efficiency. We find the type 
of rental tenure to be significant, with those renting 
from a local authority found to possess a WTP of 
AC15.54 less than those renting from private landlords, 
increasing to AC46.16 for those renting from voluntary 
or co-operative housing bodies. This is likely due to 
income and therefore budget constraints. These ef- 
fects diminish with the introduction of information, 
with the difference in WTP between those renting 
from private landlords and those renting from local 
authorities falling to AC9.14, while the difference be- 
tween those renting privately and those renting from 
housing bodies losing significance. The introduction 
of information led to an increase in WTP of those with 
members of the household under the age of 18, with 
WTP rising by AC3.72 for every additional minor. 
Upon receiving information, the WTP of those who 
knew their BER fell by AC6.64, relative to those who 
did not. Those living in energy inefficient homes are 
found to possess a WTP AC11.36 less than those living 
in homes with a BER of ‘A’, ‘B’ or ‘C’, a difference 
10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Table 3:  Likelihood of possessing a non-zero willingness-to-pay  
Without Information With Information 
(1)  (2) 
 
Tenure (ref = Rent from a private landlord) 
Rent from a local authority 0.295 (0.202) 0.0600 (0.199) 
Rent from a voluntary/co-operative housing body -0.452 (0.459) -0.202 (0.388) 
Student/Shared Accommodation 0.0540 (0.377) 0.0575 (0.399) 
In receipt of subsidy -0.105 (0.179) -0.330* (0.180) 
Tenure length (ref = Less than one year) 
    
1 - 3 years 0.517** (0.203) 0.473** (0.195) 
3 - 5 years 0.794*** (0.226) 0.702*** (0.222) 
5 - 10 years 0.620** (0.242) 0.911*** (0.240) 
10 + years 0.166 (0.274) 0.601** (0.269) 
Rent per person (AC) -0.000464 (0.000330) -0.000584* (0.000307) 
Region (ref = Dublin city) 
    
Greater Dublin Area (ex. Dublin city) -0.258 (0.216) -0.266 (0.210) 
Other Cities -0.177 (0.221) -0.0989 (0.220) 
Rest of Ireland -0.313* (0.178) -0.192 (0.174) 
Working status (ref = Working full-time) 
    
Working part-time 0.363* (0.197) 0.103 (0.193) 
Working in the home/ Carer 0.443* (0.249) 0.297 (0.251) 
Unemployed 0.437 (0.270) 0.198 (0.280) 
Retired 0.622 (0.464) 0.559 (0.496) 
Student 0.641** (0.253) 0.559** (0.250) 
Unable to work due to illness/disability 0.478 (0.332) 0.469 (0.339) 
Age -0.0159* (0.00832) -0.0255*** (0.00817) 
Occupants 18 or under -0.0726 (0.0735) -0.0844 (0.0711) 
Occupants aged 19 - 64 -0.0122 (0.0858) -0.0769 (0.0840) 
Occupants aged 65 + 0.0780 (0.266) 0.175 (0.286) 
Building Energy Rating = DEFG -0.0162 (0.169) 0.243 (0.163) 
Knew BER -0.160 (0.177) 0.0893 (0.172) 
Behaviour (z) 0.143** (0.0721) 0.123* (0.0690) 
Knowledge (z) 0.00104 (0.0704) 0.0500 (0.0672) 
Constant -0.00562 (0.480) 0.858* (0.458) 
Observations 408 408 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0776 0.0696 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
Reduced sample size due to non-complete responses to cost of rent and removal of outliers. 
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that falls to AC9.21 with the introduction of informa- 
tion. This might appear to indicate a longer payback 
period for investment in improved energy efficiency. 
Less efficient homes, however, possess more potential 
for improvement. For example, an equally costly en- 
ergy efficiency investment may lead to a greater BER 
improvement in an E-rated home, relative to a C-rated 
home, resulting in an overall greater level of WTP 
from tenants. 
Figure 6 shows the comparison of the distributions 
of conditional willingness-to-pay before and after the 
treatment. The pane on the left of the figure shows 
the overall distribution of conditional WTP for all re- 
spondents possessing a non-zero WTP either before 
or after the treatment, while the pane on the right 
compares these distributions including only those who 
expressed a non-zero WTP both before and after the 
treatment. Both panes present similar patterns, with 
the introduction of information leading to a conver- 
gence in WTP toward a greater peak in the distribu- 
tion, with a reduction in the size of the tails. It is 
likely that the information provided gave respondents 
a reference case for cost reductions available from im- 
proving energy efficiency and thus a benchmark level 
of increased rent respondents would be willing to pay 
for improved energy efficiency. 
 
As shown in table 5, the point estimate of condi- 
tional WTP for the sample fell by almost AC9, although 
this change is not statistically significant. However, 
the introduction of information led to an increase in 
the number of respondents expressing a willingness to 
pay for improved energy efficiency. As shown in Table 
1, the number of such respondents possessing a non- 
zero WTP rose from 156 to 226, an increase of almost 
45%. Including those expressing an unwillingness to 
pay for improved energy efficiency, the mean uncondi- 
tional WTP of the sample as a whole rose from AC17.45 
to AC20.77 with the introduction of information2. 
 
Our estimated levels of conditional WTP differ to 
those found by Carroll et al. (2016), who found a pro- 
gressively increasing WTP when moving from more 
to less efficient grades. At the lowest grades, where a 
change in alphanumeric grade corresponds to a change 
in letter grade, i.e. from ‘G’ to ‘F’ and from ‘F’ to 
‘E’, Carroll et al find a WTP of AC82 and AC61, re- 
spectively. While we estimate WTP for improvements 
of one alphanumeric grade, e.g. ‘D1’ to ‘C3’, Car- 
roll et al. (2016) estimate same for changes in letter 
grade. WTP at other grades are therefore not directly 
comparable. For example, an estimated WTP of AC39 
to improve from an E to a D may exceed that of 
certain sub-groups in our population in the case that 
this improvement were from a ‘E1’ to a ‘D2’, whereas 
this would not be the case for an improvement from 
‘E2’ to ‘D1’ or from ‘E1’ to ‘D1’. Our estimates are 
also higher, in turn, than the rental premium associ- 
ated with energy efficiency in the market estimated 
by Hyland et al. (2013), who found an average pre- 
mium of 0.5% of rental costs for each alphanumeric 
grade. With an average rental price of dwellings of 
AC1,005, this equates to a premium of AC5 per grade, 
much lower than the conditional WTP estimated in 
this study. Given that only a sub-sample of tenants 
possess a non-zero WTP, similarly landlords might not 
all see a value in improved Building Energy Ratings 
with regard to setting asking prices for rental proper- 
ties. 
 
4.2. Payback period of investment 
In order to examine the returns available to land- 
lords from engaging in energy efficiency investments, 
we calculate a guideline payback period of certain 
retrofit measures. This is done by analysing data on 
costs of retrofits and measured energy efficiency im- 
provements from the Better Energy Homes grant aid 
scheme. This is an administrative dataset comprising 
all applications to the scheme, which is operated by 
the Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland and pro- 
vides grants to home owners, including landlords, for a 
range of retrofit measures. These are attic insulation, 
three types of wall insulation (cavity wall insulation, 
internal dry-lining or external wall insulation), three 
types of heating system upgrade (high efficiency gas 
or oil boiler with heating controls or heating controls 
upgrade only) and/or solar heating. This dataset pro- 
vides information on the retrofit measures for which 
grant aid was applied, the total cost of each mea- 
sure and the overall energy efficiency improvement as 
a result of each retrofit3. 
 
 
 
 
2Excluding protest responses, mean WTP is calculated 
as a weighted average of the point estimate for the sample of 
respondents possessing a willingness-to-pay and 0 for those 
unwilling to pay for improved energy efficiency 
3This is calculated as the difference between the esti- 
mated BER of the property prior to retrofitting and a regis- 
tered BER assessment following retrofit works. For a more 
detailed discussion of this process, please see Collins and 
Curtis (2016a) 
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  Table 4: Conditional willingness-to-pay for improved energy efficiency  
Without Information With Information 
(3)  (4) 
 
Tenure (ref = Rent from a private landlord) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
Reduced sample size due to non-complete responses to cost of rent. 
Willingness-to-pay calculated from above as follows: W T P = β0 + ΣβiXi. 
Rent from a local authority -15.54*** (5.773) -9.138** (4.016) 
Rent from a voluntary/co-operative housing body -46.16*** (15.92) -1.584 (6.890) 
Student/Shared Accommodation -6.521 (9.910) -6.063 (6.672) 
In receipt of subsidy -0.474 (4.399) 7.784 (5.685) 
Tenure length (ref = Less than one year) 
1 - 3 years -2.152 (8.320) -6.648 (8.765) 
3 - 5 years -7.422 (11.88) -12.60 (12.15) 
5 - 10 years -0.399 (10.24) -13.32 (13.97) 
10 + years -0.0119 (8.411) -12.68 (11.53) 
Rent per person (AC) -0.00936 (0.0101) 0.0154 (0.0102) 
Working status (ref = Working full-time) 
   
Working part-time -2.439 (6.282) -1.315 (4.499) 
Working in the home/ Carer -6.329 (7.621) -2.526 (6.628) 
Unemployed -3.068 (7.872) 0.356 (5.483) 
Retired -4.504 (11.78) -1.152 (13.09) 
Student -0.781 (9.701) -11.06 (9.020) 
Unable to work due to illness/disability -12.56 (7.881) -11.08 (9.200) 
Age 0.171 (0.268) 0.276 (0.395) 
Occupants 18 or under 1.697 (1.867) 3.726** (1.847) 
Occupants aged 19 - 64 -2.822 (2.285) 0.642 (2.079) 
Occupants aged 65 + -3.812 (5.004) -5.490 (6.684) 
Building Energy Rating = DEFG -11.36*** (3.610) -9.209* (4.703) 
Knew BER 1.258 (4.288) -6.644* (3.610) 
Behaviour (z) -0.951 (2.350) 0.110 (2.234) 
Knowledge (z) 0.690 (1.567) -0.473 (1.523) 
Inverse Mills Ratio -11.59 (17.45) -23.54 (23.79) 
Constant 70.93*** (20.82) 56.86*** (15.11) 
sigma (σ) 14.97*** (1.537) 16.74*** (1.433) 
Observations 152 
 
225 
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Figure 6: Distribution of predicted willingness-to-pay before and after treatment 
 
 
 
 
 
  Table 5: Point estimates of willingness-to-pay for sub-groups of the sample  
1st WTP Question 2nd WTP Question 
  Post information  
WTP Point Standard WTP Point Standard 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Point estimates calculated using estimated parameters of models (3) and (4), holding all characteristics other 
than those of interest at their mean sample value. 
2 Calculated using the delta-method (Oehlert, 1992). 
3 Mean number of occupants under the age of 18 of households comprising one or more occupant under the age 
of 18. 
Estimate Error Estimate Error 
(AC)  (AC)  
Full sample 46.84 (7.67) 37.66 (2.49) 
BER = ABC 53.94 (7.47) 43.51 (2.75) 
BER = DEFG 42.58 (8.09) 34.30 (3.67) 
Private landlord 51.44 (8.47) 39.64 (2.58) 
Non-private landlord 34.41 (6.75) 31.22 (3.90) 
Occupants under 18 48.39 (8.53) 41.29 (2.49) 
No occupants under 18 45.59 (7.19) 34.96 (3.22) 
BER = DEFG, Private landlord, No occupants under 18 45.93 (8.34) 33.59 (4.41) 
BER = DEFG, Non-private landlord, Occupants under 183 31.69 (7.89) 31.49 (4.47) 
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We estimate the payback period of investment us- 
ing the average total cost of a variety of measures and 
discounted future income based on increasing rental 
costs at the average conditional willingness-to-pay of 
two sub-groups, these being those living in A-, B- and 
C-rated homes and those living in D-, E-, F- and G- 
rated homes. This is done for responses after treat- 
ment using the total cost of retrofitting. In addition, 
we examine how the receipt of grant aid via the Bet- 
ter Energy Homes scheme impacts these payback pe- 
riods, reducing costs by the applicable level of grant 
aid currently available under the Better Energy Homes 
scheme. We choose an annual discount rate of 10%, 
which is representative of the interest rate offered on 
personal loans by leading Irish banks for amounts simi- 
lar to the costs of retrofitting. We also estimated pay- 
back periods using a discount rate of 15% but payback 
periods for measures which were deemed to be afford- 
able to landlords were not sensitive to this change. 
 
Table 6 presents these estimated payback periods 
of some of the more popular combinations observed in 
the Better Energy Homes scheme, conditional on ten- 
ants possessing a non-zero willingness-to-pay for im- 
proved energy efficiency. The payback period is mea- 
sured as the number of months required for a landlord 
to recover their investment. Strikingly, payback peri- 
ods for external wall insulation and solar heating are 
virtually infinite. For the purposes of this analysis, we 
capped payback periods at 300 months, equivalent to 
25 years, as investments with greater payback periods 
are unlikely to be seen as worthwhile. Without grant 
aid, only apartments or mid-terrace houses possessing 
a BER between ‘D’ and ‘G’ possess a payback period 
for external wall insulation of fewer than ten years, 
although the provision of grant aid does reduce the 
payback period below ten years for all homes rated 
‘D’ or worse and A-, B- or C-rated apartments and 
mid-terrace houses. This is quite striking, given that 
the majority of rental properties for permanent resi- 
dence are located in cities, where solid walls are much 
more common than cavity walls. With high rental 
prices, landlords are unlikely to be willing to engage in 
investments possessing a long-term return structure, 
as that may require foregoing rental income while ren- 
ovations are undertaken. It may also be seen as unde- 
sirable to engage in such an investment when rental 
costs are rising as renovations need not be prioritised 
as a means of increasing income. In devising policy 
aimed at improving the energy efficiency of the rental 
market, the results of this analysis indicate that grant 
aid may be required for these measures with very long 
payback periods. This is because without grant aid, 
these investments would not be profitable for land- 
lords. Low interest financing for landlords would be 
unlikely to lead to an increase in installations of exter- 
nal wall insulation or solar heating as these payback 
periods are not very sensitive to changes in the dis- 
count rate. 
Each of the other retrofit combinations examined 
possess quite short payback periods. Even without 
grant aid, each of attic and cavity wall insulation, 
heating system upgrades and combinations thereof 
possess payback periods of approximately four years 
or less in homes considered energy inefficient. Even 
for homes in the most efficient three letter grades, 
payback periods do not exceed seven years, even in 
the absence of grant aid. On this evidence, grant aid 
may not seem necessary to induce retrofit activity in 
rental properties, provided tenants are in fact willing 
to pay for improved energy efficiency. Were policy- 
makers to consider subsidy schemes specific to the 
rental sector to promote retrofitting activities there 
is no reason why the level of subsidy should differ 
from existing subsidy levels for residential properties. 
A rental sector specific scheme may act as a nudging 
mechanism to raise the awareness of the availability of 
funding for these works. For retrofit measures where 
payback periods are very long or virtually infinite, a 
more comprehensive subsidy system may be required 
to improve energy efficiency, though whether subsidis- 
ing such measures is prudent is arguable. 
 
4.3. Robustness checks 
As discussed in Section 3.2, not all respondents 
knew the the Building Energy Rating of their accom- 
modation and, as such, unknown ratings were esti- 
mated according to Curtis et al. (2015). It is possible 
that these are not entirely accurate. As a robust- 
ness check, we estimate mean WTP before and after 
the treatment for both the sample as a whole and 
including only those respondents with knowledge of 
the Building Energy Rating of their accommodation. 
This is done by re-estimating models (3) and (4) for 
both the full and reduced sample. The estimated pa- 
rameter presented here is point estimate of the mean 
willingness-to-pay and its confidence intervals. This 
mean WTP calculated in each instance is presented 
in Table 7 alongside the log-likelihood of the model. 
As can be seen, while those who know their BER have 
a much larger estimated WTP in the no information 
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  Table 6: Payback periods of specific energy efficiency retrofit investments for landlords, in months  
No Grant Aid Better Energy Homes 
BER of property: ABC DEFG ABC DEFG 
Attic and cavity wall insulation  42 24 25 15 
External wall insulation - Apartment/mid-terrace house  >300 103 120 55 
External wall insulation - End-of-terrace/semi-detached house  >300 297 >300 108 
External wall insulation - Detached house  >300 >300 181 84 
High efficiency boiler with heating controls  49 40 38 31 
Heating controls only  40 24 22 14 
Solar thermal  >300 >300 253 >300 
Attic and cavity wall insulation, high efficiency boiler with heating controls 81 45 50 30 
Attic and cavity wall insulation, heating controls  39 32 18 15 
 
Mean Costs and BER grades improved:  
Costs (AC) BER Grades Improved 
   Total  With Current Grant ABC DEFG  
Attic and Cavity Insulation 1,537 937 1 2 
External wall insulation - Apartment/Mid-terrace 5,285 3,035 1 2 
External wall insulation - End-of-terrace/Semi-D 8,337 4,937 1 2 
External wall insulation - Detached House 8,656 4,156 1 2 
Boiler with Heating Controls 3,494 2,794 2 3 
Heating Controls only 1,470 870 1 2 
Solar Thermal 5,923 4,723 1 1 
Attic, Cavity, Boiler 5,157 3,557 2 4 
Attic, Cavity, HC 2,880 1,380 2 3 
   ABC DEFG  
Average WTP (AC) 43.51 34.3 
1 Payback period calculated with annual discount rate of 10%. 
2 Mean WTP for each sub-group are those presented in table 5 and may vary by the average grade number of grades associated with 
BER improvements for each retrofit measure. 
3 The amount of grant aid awarded for external wall insulation varies by dwelling archetype. As such, costs and improvements 
associated with these archetypes, while WTP is not found to vary across archetype. Information on the level of grant aid available 
for retrofit works is available at http://www.seai.ie/Grants/Better_energy_homes/About_the_Scheme/. 
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condition, the confidence intervals in which this esti- 
mate is bounded are quite large, perhaps owing to the 
small sample size. Regardless, differences in estimates 
are not statistically significant. 
 
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
Residential retrofits have been identified by policy- 
makers in Ireland as an opportunity for policy-makers 
to help meet policy targets for energy efficiency, 
and carbon emissions. The majority of retrofitting 
work completed through the market-based Better En- 
ergy Homes scheme have occurred in owner-occupied 
homes. Due to upward pressure on rents in Ireland 
over a number of years, there is less incentive for land- 
lords to improve the energy efficiency of rental prop- 
erties. We examine, using stated preference data, the 
willingness-to-pay of tenants for improved energy ef- 
ficiency to identify whether certain tenants are more 
likely to be willing to pay for energy efficiency. In turn, 
we then examine how much tenants are willing to pay 
for energy efficiency, measured using the Irish Build- 
ing Energy Rating. Using an administrative dataset of 
grant-aided retrofits, we examine whether grant aid is 
necessary to encourage landlords to invest in energy 
efficiency retrofit works. 
tial policy measures which could help to improve the 
energy efficiency of rental properties, which at the mo- 
ment lags behind the energy efficiency of the owner- 
occupied sector. 
Various policy implications can be taken from the 
findings of this research. Information has been shown 
to increase the likelihood that tenants are willing to 
pay increased rent for energy efficiency, with those 
possessing a non-zero willingness-to-pay also more 
likely to value non-monetary benefits of engaging in 
retrofit works, such as improved comfort and health. 
While informing tenants of these benefits may induce 
a willingness to pay for improved energy efficiency, cer- 
tain retrofit measures will not provide an ‘adequate’ 
return on investment for landlords even with current 
levels of subsidy grants. 
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Appendix A. Pro-environmental and energy-related behaviour index 
 
The following details questions regarding pro-environmental behaviours and the score attributable to each 
answer. The mean score across all applicable questions provides a raw score between 0 and 1, with 1 being the 
most preferred. Observed scores were standardised around 0 for use in analysis, using the following formula: 
Scorei − Sc¯ore 
σScore 
 
 
1. How often would you say you engage in each of the following: 
• Average of: 
 
 
   Rarely Sometimes Often 
Turn off lights when leaving a room  0  0.5  1 
Decide not to buy products due to excess packaging 0 0.5 1 
Leave tap running while brushing your teeth 1 0.5 0 
Bring your own bag when shopping 0 0.5 1 
Walk of cycle for short journeys (up to 3km) 0 0.5 1 
Car share with others who make a similar journey 0 0.5 1 
Avoid disposable products in favour of reusable 0 0.5 1 
 
 
2. Which of the following do you separate from your general waste? (Please select more than one if applicable) 
• Sum of: 
 
0.33: Dry Recycling (paper, cardboard, plastic, tetra-pak) 
0.33: Organic Waste (cooked or raw food, teabags, napkins, etc.) 
0.33: Glass (bottles and jars) 
0.33: I do not separate any of above 
 
3. How do you dispose of small batteries? 
• One of: 
 
1: Bring to shop or recycling centre 
1: Bring in to work for recycling 
1: Children bring to school for recycling 
1: Other collection point 
1: Other 
0: General waste (do not recycle batteries) 
 
4. Thinking of the last time your household purchased an electric appliance, such as a toaster, washing machine, 
etc., how much did each of the following influence your decision? 
• If applicable, sum of: 
19 
 
 
 
 
Had no 
influence 
 
Had only a 
minor influence 
 
Had a major 
influence 
Took precedence in 
influencing the 
  decision  
 
 
 
 
5. What is your household’s main method of disposing of small electrical and electronic equipment such as 
toasters, hair-dryers, mobile phones, etc.? 
• If applicable, one of: 
 
0: Put them in household general waste 
1: Return them to retailer 
1: Bring to a recycling centre 
1: Re-use, e.g. give to a family member or friend 
1: Stored at home 
 
6. How often do you change electricity and/or gas provider? 
• One of: 
1: Every year 
0.75: Every 2–3 years 
0.5: Every 4–5 years 
0.25: Every 6–10 years 
0: Never 
 
7. If you own a car, how much did each of the following influence your decision when making the purchase? 
• If applicable, sum of: 
 
 
Had no 
influence 
 
Had a minor 
influence 
 
Had a major 
influence 
Took precedence 
in influencing 
  the decision  
Price 0 0 0 0 
Brand Reputation 0 0 0 0 
Size 0 0 0 0 
Colour 0 0 0 0 
Energy efficiency Rating 0 0.33 0.66 1 
Other aspect(s) 0 0 0 0 
 
Price 0 0 0 0 
Annual level of motor tax 0 0 0 0 
Fuel consumption 0 0 0 0 
Other costs (insurance, servicing, etc.) 0 0 0 0 
Environmental concerns (e.g. car emissions) 0 0.33 0.66 1 
Resale Value 0 0 0 0 
Family Requirements 0 0 0 0 
Other aspects 0 0 0 0 
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Appendix B. Energy-related Knowledge Index 
The following details questions regarding energy-related knowledge and the score attributable to each answer. 
The sum of all scores provides a raw score, which is then standardised about zero using the following formula: 
Scorei − Sc¯ore 
σScore 
 
 
1. To which of the following does this label refer? 
 
• One of: 
 
0: Building Energy Rating 
0: Vehicle fuel efficiency label 
1: Home appliance energy efficiency label 
0: Water efficiency label 
0: Don’t know 
 
2. To which of the following does this label refer? 
 
• One of: 
 
1: Building Energy Rating 
0: Vehicle fuel efficiency label 
0: Home appliance energy efficiency label 
0: Water efficiency label 
0: Don’t know 
 
3. What is your yearly electricity consumption, in kilowatt hours? 
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• One of: 
1: 0–5,000 
1: 5,000–10,000 
1: 10,000–15,000 
1: 15,000–20,000 
1: 20,000–25,000 
1: 25,000–30000 
1: 30,000+ 
0: Don’t know 
 
4. How much do you think each of the following fuels cost per delivered unit og energy (kilowatt hour)? 
• Sum of: 
 
  1–10 cent  
Peat 1 
10–20 cent  
0 
20–30 cent  
0 
Don’t know  
0 
Coal 1 0 0 0 
Oil 1 0 0 0 
Natural Gas 1 0 0 0 
Electricity (day rate) 0 1 1 0 
5. In each of the following cases, please choose the option which you think produces less emissions per unit 
energy produced 
• Sum of: 
 
   A B 
A: Peat or B: Oil 0 1 
 
 
  A: Electricity or B: Peat 0 1  
 
6. Do you know how much your last gas bill cost? 
• One of: 
1: AC0–AC25 
1: AC26–AC50 
1: AC51–AC75 
1: AC76–AC100 
1: AC101–AC124 
1: AC125–AC150 
1: AC150+ 
0: Don’t know 
A: Gas or B: Electricity 1 0 
A: Gas or B Coal 1 0 
A: Coal or B: Oil 0 1 
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Appendix C. Perceived effects of engaging in certain retrofit measures 
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